Abstract
Introduction
Kwame Gyekye defends a left-communitarianism critically founded on his view that the individual and her community are morally of equal value or standing, an idea Gyekye calls their equiprimordiality. The equiprimordiality of person and community is primarily a structural defense against bers and even between specific individuals and their communities. This is to say that for Gyekye value is ultimately relational. My object is to give an account of Gyekye's communitarianism and of the critique of liberalism it contains. I shall not be concerned with liberal objections to Gyekye's views and so will largely ignore the issue except where it affects points of exegesis.
Rights of the collective and individual rights 2.1 The associative concept of community and the relational concept of personhood
Since much of what Gyekye attempts to defend as rights (of the individual and of the community) turn on his conception of the collectivity, I begin by making some distinctions. Gyekye (1997:39-47 ) favours the associative concept of community, which he implicitly contrasts with the aggregative concept. Association is the view that the collective is constituted by patterns of interpersonal relationships and indeed, that the association is structured by these relationships and the (sociological, cultural, traditional) rules they imply (Bird, 1999:87-90) . Individuals com prise the collective; they (re)produce the relationships which make up their association. How they do that marks the difference between strong and weak association, as we shall shortly see. According to the associa tive view community is "a group of persons linked by interpersonal bonds, which are not necessarily biological, who consider themselves primarily as members of a group and who share common goods, values, and interests. The notion of a shared life -shared purposes, interests, and understandings of the good" (Gyekye, 1997:42) is central to this conception. Ontologically the community is "a reality in itself (Gyekye, 1997:42) , grounded in the "fundamentally relational character of the person and the interdependence of human individuals arising out of their natural sociality" (Gyekye, 1997:38) . Relationality and sociality are necessary attributes. "The person is constituted, at least partly, by social relation ships in which he necessarily finds himself (Gyekye, 1997:38) . Members share a way of life; they have "intellectual and ideological as well as emotional attachments to their shared goals and values and ... they are ever ready to pursue and defend them" (Gyekye, 1997:42) . Their relationships are regulated by culturally reinforced "reciprocities, comprehensive interactions, and mutual sympathies and responsibilities" (Gyekye, 1997:42) which run on "a loyalty and commitment to the community" (Gyekye, 1997:43) experienced as "the desire to advance its interests" (Gyekye, 1997:43) . A community structured by such relation ships and loyalties imply that in assuming the normative point of view an (Bird, 1999:88 (Bird, 1999:90) . But as soon as individuals count morally as autonomous units apart from and independent of structured relationships, and qua autonomous units enjoy moral standing of equal value as that which they have in structured relationships, irreducibility is compromised. In Gyekye these relationships are organic but not structured by ethnic loyalties (Gyekye, 1997:104 105). Irreducible relationships tend to diminish the moral significance of the distinction between the two sets of membership relations mentioned above. The rules by which individuals act and those by which the collective act tend to be the same set (Bird, 1999 :91) which means that rights are easily transferred from individuals to the collective (Bird, 1999: 91) . Social contexts in which irreducibility is more or less compromised tend to exploit the distinction to demarcate an uncompromisable space for individual rights. A disanalogy between private and public agency is apparent (Bird, 1999:91) together with a concomitant disjunction between the rules by which individuals and collectives are held to act (Bird, 1999: 91) . Individuals are separable from the relationships in which they participate without loss of moral status, but in spite of the space created for disanalogy and disjunction in Gyekye's theory, the collective interest may in specific contexts become overriding. An agent's status as moral agent is not exhausted by her being an individual-as-unit; she bears title to rights but she also has responsibilities to the collective. For Bird (1999:94) the ultimate contrast between the aggregative and the associative conceptions reduces to the proposal that the latter "privileges specific interpersonal relationships over the interests of individuals considered in isolation". I maintain that this has a significant implication for what it means to adopt the moral point of view. Bird (1999:90) supplies a comprehensive statement of this implication which I here adopt. An account of public agency may be said to be symmetrical if "the normative point of view under which the public agency acts on behalf of the collectivity is analogous to the normative point of view under which individual agents act on their own behalf, i.e. if "there are analogies between justified individual agency and justified collective or public agency" (Bird, 1999:95 In an asymmetrical view ... the principles by which governments determine the appropriate action for the collectivity as a whole will bear no particular resemblance to those invoked by private agents as they lead and pursue their own lives and projects. But Gyekye's disjunctions and disanalogies are not complete because a notion of the common good, a substantive one, may on appropriate occasion be overriding. The norm of the common good insinuates itself into individual self-reflection in a way which attenuates conceptions of particularity, difference and identity, thus shaping commitments to act in certain approved ways. Gyekye's state paternalism will be examined shortly. For the moment I wish to stress that asymmetry (Bird's term -1999:91) is not fully realized. Gyekye (1997:45) says explicitly that the common good does not consist of, and cannot be derived from, "the goods or preferences of particular individuals" and that it is "not a surrogate for the sum of the different individual goods". Rather, the common good is a "substrate of commonly shared values and self understandings" (Gyekye, 1997:46) which underpin organized human society. Its overridingness (when appropriate) is exactly that feature of his thinking which distinguishes him from Western individual liberal theorists (Gyekye, 1997:103).
Persons-as-units and persons-in-relation: who is the locus of the value?
What does it mean to say that the common good is overriding? Though, as I have maintained, asymmetry is not complete, individual rights are nevertheless genuine. Their existence mean that there are culturally endorsed rules and principles for individuals to formulate life plans which are not analogous to the rules and principles which specify how the collectivity should be ordered. Private and public agency, then, are disanalogous. Yet, in Gyekye, this does not entail that the collective plan cannot be accorded priority over individuals' plans (whenever appropriate), and, indeed, be overriding. has significant value for many people, and this counts as an interference and a coercion. In Gyekye no one has the freedom to renege on the ethic of re sponsibility i.e. on actions and behaviours "conducive to the promotion of the well-being of others" (Gyekye, 1999:50). Individuals act morally correctly, and thus are worthy of being accorded respect, when they act as autonomous agents, i.e. when they freely submit to the required restraint. But this means that they accept and internalize the authority of justified communally based decisions which are initially external to themselves. At play here is a concept of liberty which equates liberty with a self-restraining motivational capacity. State action aimed at inculcating the desired restraint may, in view of the connection between liberty and restraint, be seen not only as compatible with liberty but also as education for the realization of liberty. The liberty at issue here is positive liberty, the freedom to do things rather than the freedom from interference or coercion by others. The notion of "liberty to" is the "capacity building" conception favoured by Gyekye. It is the key, opines Gyekye (1997:141), to integrating "political liberty (individual freedom) and social welfare" in a sociopolitical framework which gives concrete expression to the idea of "social and political equality" (Gyekye, 1997:141). Gyekye (1997:142) advocates a "comprehensive conception of democracy" which will give recognition to social and economic rights, on par with political rights, as necessary conditions of the functioning of humans in society (Gyekye, 1997:142)8. "Political rights cannot be divorced from economic well-being: a person may be free politically and yet not free to pursue and realize his or her chosen purposes in life because the necessary conditions are denied him or her" (Gyekye, 1997:193). All citizens must have equal opportunity to influence political decisions, yet the capacity to make effective use of such opportunities vary widely in proportion to differences in wealth and social standing (Gyekye, 1997:142-143). Liberty deficits are best righted by institutions which establish a minimum threshold for equality regarded as adequate for public functioning and below which citizens cannot reasonably be expected to influence the outcome of deliberation. The minimum thres hold must be guaranteed as a way of protecting the weak against the strong and this requires restraint to ensure that the weak are not Foucault's (1982: 781) notion of "a form of power which makes individual subjects". Foucault recognizes "two meanings of the word 'subject': subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to". Kernohan, like Galbraith and Young, is concerned with the latter. In the relevant Foucaultian sense tying people "to the conception of the good which form their own identities ... subjects ... them to their culture" (Kernohan, 1998:17) . Subjugation in this sense, however, is not necessarily harmful. Subjugation is harmful if, for any individual, it interferes with "the very process of forming a conception of the good" (Kernohan, 1998:26) , in knowing her good or in implementing her conception of the good, which is a harm to self-respect. If she is coerced 18 Both examples are borrowed from Kernohan (1998:12-13 shared and common past and future" that leads them to pursue reason as a means of realizing the favoured shared life-form. Eze (1997:318 319) thinks the latter weighs heavily with Gyekye and Wiredu. They tend to conflate the "conflictual" with the "irrational" and the "rational" with the "consensual", and this conflation is clearly a cultural bias for harmony over conflict, i.e. for a politics of the common good over a politics of difference and individualism. There is not "much self-evident truth" (Eze, 1997:320) in the notion that the favoured ordering mechanism of Akan society is a universal preference, one that can be teased from some analysis of the human condition. The interplay between internal and external limits to the violation of liberty determines a certain conception of the public realm: it is not a unity transcending group differences but rather a unity-in-diversity; the differences needed for identity construction remain unassimilated at the level of the social group in the sense in which social groups are first-tier solidarity groups. But the multi-dimensional aspect of membership of first-tier identifying groups, and the concomitant multidimensional identity construction which this makes possible, give rise to second-tier solidarity. Private life, in contradistinction to public life, then becomes a part of a person's life which she chooses -with justification -to withdraw from Metanatlonaliiy, comprehensive democracy and left communitarian rights developed in the wake of differential patterns of distribution tend to assimilate difference and marginalize historical identities. This is a source of serious social tension. The problem is clearly that the open market favours those who hold the advantages, irrespective of how those advantages have been accumlated.. Like Gyekye, Ryan thinks the self needs to be reconceptualized. In the multicultural society there is no space for a non-relational self, and by implication, no space for non-relational action in civic or civil society. The self, then, must cease to be an owner for whom rights are property. If this be granted, the right to equal treatment becomes inseparable from its institutional context, and the "interrelational character of social wealth" (Ryan, 1989 :117) and hence inseparable from material equality. So the doctrine of rights become a doctrine of exercisable rights" (Ryan, 1989:162) . Only a state assisted capacity building programme can ensure that this outcome is achieved. And achieving this outcome is essential to the construction of second-tier solidarity.
• The need for equity between regions
The last point touches on the need for equity between regions. Thornton (1996:154) believes rightly that the metropolitan regions of South Africa are affluent compared to the rural-traditional regions. "South Africa is a country stretched as thin as a sheet over three points of power and wealth." They are Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban, veritable "citystates, not just cities" (Thornton, 1996:154) , "each with its own identity and allegiances" (Thornton, 1996:154) . It is only recently, notes Thornton (1996:157) , that a universal politics in which "all persons are the primary units" have been established. But in this set-up the inhabitants of the metropolitan regions have all the advantages, economic and political. At least what they lack by way of direct political clout, they make up by way of economic influence disproportionate to their numbers. Social inte gration around the idea of a shared constitutional dispensation -a constitutional patriotism -which is a feature of Gyekye's second-tier solidarity, will not be achieved if the means to exercising political rights, means beyond the present political poverty line, remains insufficient and beyond reach.
